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Summary findings
Orlowski argues that Poland must choose an agricultural  inflows) may jeopardize farmers' relative income
policy that promotes  efficiency, structural change, and  position. And such developments are probable if positive
adjustment to the new market environment and eventual  projections for economic development and membership
membership in the European Union. That  policy must  in the European Union are realized.
take into account both the needs of, and the financial  The agriculture sector can defend its relative income
constraints  on, Polish agriculture.  only by becoming more efficient.
Results of simulation experiments performed with the  Price supports improve farmers' relative income but at
use of the computable general equilibrium model of the  a high cost to taxpayers and consumers and to
Polish economy suggest that Common Agricultural  macroeconomic efficiency. To meet these costs, Poland
Policy-type price supports are not the most efficient  must put in place firm quantity controls. But the best
agricultural policy for Poland. Orlowski discusses  strategy would be to avoid price supports until the
alternative policies and scenarios.  moment of joining the European Union's Common
Rather than discuss whether the relationship between  Agricultural Policy, says Orlowski.
farmers' incomes and average Polish wages is fair,  In the interim, policies aimed at reducing farm
Orlowski analyzes whether medium- and long-term  employment seem most appropriate.  Orlowski discusses
development trends in the Polish economy may cause  two such policies: encouraging older farmers to retire
this relationship to deteriorate,  and what policies will  and promoting jobs in rural areas.
counteract those trends. Rapid growth  in the  He also proposes two feasible scenarios for integrating
nonagricultural sectors combined with real appreciation  Polish agriculture with that of the European Union by
of domestic currency (caused either through good  2005-10.
current  account performance or significant capital
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1. Introduction
The economic  transformation  of Poland, started in 1990, has resulted in a new, more open
and competitive  environment  for all economic  agents. Polish agriculture  has found itself in a totally
new situation. The new market conditions  require a deep structural adjustment,  in a search for a new
equilibrium  position. The Polish agriculture  has to face two major challenges:
(1)  General  liberalization  of the economy,  and particularly  opening  to the world market and a
market-led  economic  growth;
(2)  Integration with the European  Union, that will eventually  lead to a full membership  of Poland
in EU.
Is the Polish agriculture  of today ready to face these challenges  (taking into account that both
targets,liberalization  and adjusting  to highly regulative  EU agricultural  policies, are to a certain
degree contradictory)? And, if the answer is "no", what policies may ease the way to the new
equilibrium? We have tried to answer these questions, using a Computable  General Equilibrium
model of the Polish agricultural  policy.
A good starting point for the analysis  was provided  by a report on the agricultural  strategy for
Poland, prepared by a Polish/EC/World  Bank team in 1990 (Agricultural  Strategy for Poland, 1990).
The main conclusion  of the report was that the key issue of adjusting  of the Polish agriculture  to the
new market environment  does not lie in the farm sector, but in the agribusiness  sector. The report
stressed necessity  to improve its efficiency  by privatization,  demonopolization  and appropriate  policies
encouraging  rural development. The key message  of the report - the need to improve the agricultural
and rural market environment  - remains, beyond any doubt, valid.  However, the experience  of the
years 1990-94  shows that the abilities  to adjust of the farm sector might have been  judged in a
somehow  too optimistic  way.  Also the economic,  political and social developments  of these years
have modified  external conditions  of the agricultural  policy.  In this paper we try to evaluate  costs
and benefits of policies that ease a process of transformation  of the farming sector.
The issue of the agricultural  policy, its costs and benefits, seems to be particularly interesting,
given a broad dispute on  problems  connected  with the eventual  membership  of Poland in the
European  Union (EU).  Polish agriculture  will be therefore included  in a framework  of the Common
Agricultural  Policy (CAP), with all -good and bad - consequences. Economists  generally  stress costs
of extending CAP to Poland, and the other Central and Eastern European  (CEE) countries. However,
differences  among authors in estimating  these costs are sizeable. While the lowest estimates  for CEE
countries  reach about ECU 3-4 bn per year (CEPR, 1992; Baldwin, 1994, Tangermann,  1994), the
highest  ones reach ECU 40 bn per year (Anderson  and Tyers, 1993).  Also policy recommendations
given by various authors to the CEE countries in a pre-accession  period vary.  Some authors propose
an immediate  introduction  of a CAP-type  price supporting system (however, with target prices much
lower than in the EU, see Nallet and Van Stolk, 1994). Others claim that the CEE countries  should
avoid rapid increases  in their agricultural  prices; after all, one does not know what the EU price levelPrice Support  at Any Price?  4
will be in  10 years'  time, given the GATT Urugway  Round Agreement (URA) and a likely reform of
the CAP  (Mahe,  1994, Buckwell,  1994, Tangermann,  1994, Tardidi,  1994).  Finally,  some authors
suggest that an extension of the CAP to CEE countries in not feasible at all in the foreseeable future,
because of high budgetary costs (Anderson and Tyers,  1993, Baldwin,  1994).  The conclusions are
generally drawn from partial equilibrium models,  with assumed parameters that decide about the
supply response of the CEE agricultural sector to higher price levels.
What should be an appropriate agricultural policy for Poland?  The answer depends on an
appropriate setting of targets of such a policy.  The obvious choice would be to set targets similar to
the CAP.  The Treaty of Rome (Art.39,  §. 1) calls for a policy that allows:  (1) to promote efficiency
growth,  (2) to achieve a reasonable balance between farmers'  income and incomes coming from other
activities, (3) to stabilize markets and to achieve a certain level of self-dependence in agricultural
production ("security of supply"), (4) to stabilize prices for producers and consumers.  These targets
do compete one with another,  so the problem of definition of an objective function has a crucial
meaning for setting the agricultural policy.  In fact, the progress in achieving the above goals by the
CAP is considered as very slow (Bowler,  1985) while the costs of the policy - namely transfers  from
taxpayers,  consumers, and macroeconomic costs of resources misallocation - exploding (Hill,  1984).
One may ask whether an agricultural policy of price/income supporting is necessary at all.
Munk gives a review of the discussion on reasons  for implementing agricultural policies,  generally
based on welfare economics (Munk,  1993).  Let us note that almost all the industrial nations have
implemented active agricultural policies (today,  New Zealand is the only case of the agriculture nearly
without subsidies).  At the same time there  is an overwhelming criticism of these policies, considered
costly,  non-efficient, protectionist  and market-disrupting.  If one wants to generalize very broadly,  the
main reason for implementing policies supporting agricultural prices or incomes is provided by the
growing gap between productivity of labor in traditional agriculture  (based on medium-sized family-
owned farms) and that in the other sectors of the economy.  An income generated  in the agricultural
sector (in normal market conditions) would not allow farmers to have a living standard comparable to
the nation's  average.  Thus,  the alternatives for the policy would appear to be either to allow
traditional agriculture to be replaced by specialized, industrial-type food production (and the major
part of the existing agricultural labor force shifted to the non-agricultural activities) or somehow
increase farmers'  income.  The first option is likely to entail considerable transactional social costs.
The second option brings the risk of dismantling (or at least severely interfering with) the market
mechanisms and entailing large costs for budget and consumers.  In our view, agricultural policy is in
fact a macroeconomic rather than sectoral issue: how much can the nation afford (in the form of
direct and indirect transfers  to the agricultural sector) to achieve fulfillment of certain social targets,
and what tools should be used to minimize the cost of the policy.  There is also a microeconomic
problem connected with it: what tools should be used to minimize the market distortions caused by
the policy.
In this paper we will argue that the most  efficient  way in which Poland can secure a
reasonable  level offarmers'  income involves an accelerated  reduction of agricultural  employment.
A very high agricultural  employment,  and a small average size of farms, represents  the biggest gapPrice Support at Any Price?  5
between  Polish agriculture  and the agriculture  of the European  Union (Poczta, 1993). Therefore, a
policy aimed at reducing agricultural  employment  allows to achieve  two goals at the same time:
increasing  average income and easing the way of integration  with the EU.
2.  Agricultural  Policy - Does Poland  Need It?
This section discusses  the starting point for the analysis. The basic questions are:
(a)  What is the current level of development  of the Polish agricultural  sector, and what structural
reforms are necessary  to improve its efficiency?
(b)  Are there clear development  trends that may result in a deterioration  of farmers' income
relation relative to other households  in the medium-  and long-term?
(c)  What factors are crucial for integrating  the Polish agriculture  with EU?
2.1 Polish agriculture in early 1990s: structural  problems
Poland has inherited from communism  a mostly  private, but  inefficient  agriculture  of an
extremely  traditional  structure. The agrarian structure is dominated  by small-sized  family-owned
farms (farmns  below 10 hectares i.e. 25 acres represent over 80% of the total population of farms and
use almost 57% of a land, a very high proportion by European  standards, see Figure 1).
Productivity  of labor is
very low: employment  in  Polish Agriulture  vis-i-vis EU
agriculture reaches 3.6 mn  (land distributon by size of farms)
people (25% of total
employment, 1993), while  POAIb091
gross value added produced  in  /r\
agriculture is only slightly  Wm bOW=10h (57.3%)
above 6% of total Polish
GDP.  The productivity  of
capital is almost as low as in
the case of labor.  The key  EUAv"wagl0l  w10  a(14w  1%)
problem is an inefficient
structure of agriculture  that
does not allow to make good
use of production  factors  r  ________
(Poczta, 1993). Another
problem is the efficiency  of  Figure  1Price Support at Any Price?  6
distribution and processing of agricultural products, which is also relatively low (Agricultural Strategy
for Poland,  1990).
At the starting point of the economic reforms in the early  1990s, the average competitive
position of Polish products  on world markets remained quite good.  New concessions were given to
agricultural exports by the association agreement between Poland and the EU (increased quotas,  some
reductions of tariffs; Czyzewski, Orlowski,  Zienkowski,  1993b).  Nevertheless, the rise of
agricultural prices to (or above) the world prices level resulted in a growing competition on the
national market between imports and domestically produced goods.  Such a situation created a threat
to the interests of Polish producers.  In result of this, an agricultural  policy debate started.  The
agricultural lobby pushed for the introduction of a system of high tariffs,  variable levies and non-tariff
barriers,  as well as towards budget-subsidized preferential credits and minimum prices for basic
products.  Eventually, after an initial liberalization and a fall of the Producer Subsidy Equivalent
(PSE, a measure of a level of protection of agriculture) to a low negative level in 1990-91, a new
system of protection was put in place (the level of protection vary depending on sectors).  Total
transfers to farmers  in 1993 were estimated on a level of $ 2.4 bn'  (the PSE around  15%, compared
with about 48% in the EU, OECD  1995).
The Polish farming sector,  although mostly private, has had considerable problems  in
adjusting to the new market conditions.  Prices liberalization has resulted in a substantial
deterioration of the position of agriculture with respect to the other sectors: the terms of trade of
agricultural products vis-a-vis non-agricultural products bought by farmers worsened during  1990-91
by more then 60  %2.  A reduced level of demand for food resulted  in a totally new situation of
production  surpluses.  During the period  1990-93, the gross agricultural output decreased by  13%
(however, the fall was observed mainly in the state-owned sector; the fall of output in private farms
was only 3%).  Low adjustment abilities of the traditional farming sector,  caused by an inflexible
production  function and a role of the sector as a resource reservoir (Timmer,  1989) may represent a
major  impediments to restructuring  the Polish agriculture in a medium- and long-run.  Therefore,  an
appropriate agricultural  policy for Poland should concentrate on factors that make the adjustment
easier and faster.
1  Excluding  subsidies  to KRUS (social security fund for farmers).  In this text we follow the OECD
methodology  of excluding  this type of subsidies from agricultural  policy costs.  We treat social security as a
separate issue (subsidies  are paid not only to the social security  fund for farmers).
2  One may argue, however, that the terms of trade that the agriculture  enjoyed in late 1980s  were
artificially  high, mainly  due to effects of a initial food prices liberalization  performed in a chaos of the
disintegrating  command  economy. Terms of trade of agriculture  vis-a-vis  other sectors, relatively  stable until
1987, started to grow rapidly (in favor of agriculture) in the years 1988-89. If a relation  of prices of
agricultural  products to goods and services bought by farms in 1986 stands  for 100, in 1989 it has reached 122.
Even a more dramatic growth  was observed  in a relation  of prices of agricultural  products  to non-agricultural
inputs  purchased  by farms: the relation  grown from 100 in 1986  to 136  in 1989.Price Support  at Any Price?  7
The Polish farming sector is not homogenous. Private farms may be divided into two
categories: a dynamic  sector, about 45% of farms, which increase  productivity  and output, producing
about 60% of the value added, and a stagnating  sector, where productivity  and output are falling
(Hunek, 1995).
Polish  Agriculture  viv-a-vis EU
(indices,  EU-1  2 average-1  00)
Average  farm size
Value  Addedifarmer  (PPP  adjusted  XR)*  1  5
Value  Addedifarmer  (current  XR)*
Gr.output/farmer  (physical  measures)*
Gross  output/ha  (physical  measures)*
Employment  In agrlc.per  1  00  ha  __  __  __
Value  added  In agric.  (% of  GDP)  -
Farmers  (%  of total  empl.)  _
*  Polish  agriculture  1991  0  100  200  300  400  500
[I] of which:  developing  sector  (see  text)
*  1966.1UOSYUSQ.  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~~~~~HMOK1I  rI  us
Figure  2
Figure 2 provides a comparison  of the current situation of the Polish agricultural sector and
the EU average. The black bars show the average indices for the whole sector, the white bars refer
to the dynamic sector.
The figure shows that gross output  per hectare is similar for Poland and the EU if measured
in physical  measures. However, the relation  deteriorates  dramatically  if related to the number  of
farmers: the Polish farmer produces only a small fraction of the output and value added produced  by
the average EU farmer (around 25-30%). Also the average farm area represents  less than 40% of thePrice Support at Any Price?  8
EU level 3. Let us note, that all the measures  are slightly better when only the dynamic sector is taken
into account. The main message  of the figure is as following:  Polish agriculture  employs  4 times
more farmers  per hectare that the Western European  agriculture. With a comparable  level of output
per hectare, all efficiency  parameters  (per farmer) are several times smaller in Poland.  Reduction of
the excess employment  in agriculture  is the main structural  problem that must be solved to improve
farmers' income  and to integrate  successfully  with the EU.  It is also a condition for making an
appropriate  and efficient  use of the other production  factors (Poczta, 1993).
2.2  Income parity: what may endanger it?
The fall in the income relation  (a ratio of average income  per farmer 4 and average wage
outside agriculture)  in 1990s  is always used as a main point while advocating  a need to support the
agricultural sector in Poland.  One may argue, however, that the situation  of Polish farmers is  not as
bad.  First, as it was mentioned  above, the fall in the income relation is measured with respect to an
artificially  high base of late 1980s. Second, a significant  part of farmers' income is coming from
outside farming activities  (data of the IERiGZ, the Institute  of Economics  of Agriculture  and the Food
Economy, based on sampling, show that around 50% of income of farmers is coming from non-
farming activities). Third,  the situation differs substantially  between  the dynamic sector and the
stagnating  sector, so the average change in the income relation may be misleading.
This  paper does not discuss whether the current income relation is high enough or not.  It
rather tries to analyze whether  there are medium- and long-term development  trends in the Polish
economy  that may lead to deterioration  of this relation.
For the analysis  we use a Computable  General Equilibrium  model of the Polish economy
POLAGR  (see Box 1).  The model was specially  developed  for evaluating  effects of various
agricultural  policies.
Sensitivity  analysis is used in order to assess the factors that may endanger  the level of the
income relation. We start from the base solution of the model (a steady  case) for the period 1991-
2010, and see what directions  of changes  in the income relation  generated  by the model are caused  by
changes in key macroeconomic  factors outside agriculture 5. In the base run we generate  a steady
growth path without any active agricultural  policy (i.e. without  price/income  supporting).  The
3 The  comparisons  with  the EU  average  may  be misleading:  a 16.5ha  EU average  farm  size reflects  both,
the 70ha  farms  of UK  (10 times  a Polish  farm  area), and  5.5ha Greek  farm  (smaller  than  the Polish  average
farm).
4 It should  be stressed,  that the income  of farmers  includes  both income  from  farming  activities  and from
other  sources  (wage  income,  social  security  transfers,other  transfers).
5 Using  the  year 1991  as a starting  point  is connected  with a fact, that the PSE  level  in that year  was  on a
low level  close  to zero  (estimated  at -3%)...  ....  . .. . ...........  .. . ....... . . .. ......  ... . ...  ....
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active agricultural  policy as well, but seeks for alternative  growth paths.  Therefore, the analysis
concentrates  on evaluating  effects of a different  path of growth on the income relation, without any
policy counteraction  (the results should be interpreted  as likely directions of changes  rather than
forecasts).
Economic  growth assumed  in the base solution  (generally  based on the long-term  projections
of the World Bank, 1994) reaches  4.4% yearly (see table 2.1), with growth of investment
considerably  higher than growth of consumption. A 3.7% annual increase of the personal
consumption  is not equal for all groups of goods  and services. Consumption  of food products grows
only by 1.7% yearly and consumption  of non-food  goods and services  by 4.6%.  Structural  changes
in agriculture are moderate. The number of farmers  falls by one quarter between 1991 and 2010
(average  yearly fall of 1.6%) and the average farm area grows by more than 2 hectars. As growth of
output per farmer reaches  3.3% yearly, and average wage grows only by 3% yearly,  a 11  % increase
of the income relation  takes place.
Tab.2.1 The base solution -main indicators
J  =  <-  =  Index  Average
growth
1991  2010  rate  l
Gross Domestic  Product  100.0  224.9  4.4%
of which:
Personal Consumption  100.0  200.2  3.7%
Fixed Capital Formation  100.0  363.2  7.0%
Income Relation  (fanners' income/wage)  100.0  110.8  0.5%
Number of farmers (in millions)  3.285  2.416  -1.6%
Average farm area (in hectars)  6.3  8.6  1.6%
Output per farmer  100.0  184.6  3.3%
Source: Model POLAGR, simulation Jan. 1995
In the sensitivity  analysis, three factors that may have an important  impact  on the income
relation were taken into account:
(a)  the rate of growth of GDP in non-agricultural  sectors;
(b)  the scale of the real appreciation  of zloty;
(c)  efficiency  gains in agriculture  (we define efficiency  gains as growth of value added exceeding
growth of output).Price Support at Any Price?
Figure 3 shows the
likely impact of the growth  Sensitivity  Analysis
rate  outside  agriculture  on the  Income  relation  and  GDP  growth  rate
income
relation 6. The base run  1  Ir2oom  relation  (tarmeru  s)
assumes a 4.4%  average GDP
growth rate in the period  1991-  1.15  ,'
2010.  The sensitivity analysis  . gr
shows, that the higher the  1.10  ,averagegroh  34%
growth rate, the bigger the  s  ge  gmNth4.4% (bin)
risk of the faU in the income  1.06  averag  growth 6.4%
relation.  This is mainly due to
a fact that a higher growth rate  1.00o
is accompanied by higher
growth of productivity  in non  0.96 - lire  ,  0b  ,  of  IO
agricultural  sectors and higher  *2]
growth of real wages.  Figure  3
Figure 4 shows the
impact of real appreciation of
the domestic currency (defined  Sensitivity  Analysis
as a  rate of devaluation  lower  Income  relation  and  zloty  appreciation
than the inflation rate) on the
income relation.  The impact is  1.20
negative: the higher  the real
appreciation,  the bigger the  1.15
risk of a fall  in the income
relation.  This result is due to  1.10
the current level of prices of  real apprcaton  33%
basic agricultural products in  1  ml  rea appreclaton 66%
Poland, close to the world  .0/
market level.  Therefore, a real
appreciation of zloty makes  .00
Polish food non-competitive on
the world market (if exports  20.bo 205  Mo
are not subsidized).  Moreover,
as prices of basic agricultural  Figure  4
6 As the graphs show, increase of the income relation over time is not smooth even in the base run.
Differences  among various subperiods  are mainly caused by demographic  trends (the model  produces detailed
projections  of a process of retirement  of farmers, based on the demographic  structure  observed in 1991).Price Support  at Any Price?  12
products are linked in the model to the world prices, the income from farming  activities is linked to
them as well. If the real appreciation  of zloty takes place, the level of agricultural  income remains
almost unchanged  in dollar terms, that means a relative fall  terms).
Figure 5 presents the
impact of efficiency  gains in  Sensitivity  Analysis
agriculture on the income  Income  relation  and  efficiency  gains  in agriculture
relation. In the base run, no
such gains was assumed. In  1.40  noome  relation  ffamnerseaver  a)
the sensitivity  analysis we have
tested the impact  of 1-2%  1.30 -.
yearly efficiency  gains (the  . yearly  effidency  gains 2%
gains of this order were  1.20 - y  e  n  g
recorded in Western Europe).  no  effidency  gains  (s
The higher the efficiency  1.10  - ,no  effldency  gains  os)
gains, the smaller the risk of  .
the fall in the income relation.  1.00  -
0.90 -i  ioi  , sobs  2010
Figure  5
The conclusions  that can be drawn from the sensitivity  analysis  are that a fast rate of growth
of non-agricultural  sectors, accompanied  by the real appreciation  of the domestic currency (caused
either by a good current account  performance,  or by a significant  capital inflow), may seriously
jeopardize the relative income position of farmers. Such developments  are quite probable, if the
positive scenario of the economic  development  and integration  with the EU realizes. The agricultural
sector may defend successfully  the income relation  by increasing its efficiency  (reducing  input
requirements).
2.3  Integration  with the European  Union
An active agricultural  policy may be required by the process of Poland's accession  to the EU.
Extending  the CAP to the new members from Central and Eastern Europe is seen as one of the main
challenges  for the enlargement. The basic question  is whether CEE countries should introduce  a
price supporting  system as a necessary  condition  for the accession  (a price supporting  system, not
only a price stabilizing  system), and what would be costs of such a system.
It is generally  known that the most important  part of the CAP is a price supporting  system,
that causes EU market prices to be far higher than the world prices level for the lion's share of thePrice Support  at Any Price?  13
agricultural  production. This requires huge transfers from consumers  and taxpayers to farmers, as
well as a complicated  system of border barriers (import levies and export subsidies)  that allow EU
exporters  to sell goods abroad at world prices, and to import food without  creating a threat for EU
producers. At the same time free circulation  of agricultural  products within the single market of the
EU is provided  for.  A precondition  for integrating  national  food markets into a single, barrier-free
common  market, is the same (or similar) level of price supporting 7.
Such a requirement  does not mean, however, that CEE countries  must introduce  a CAP-type
price supporting  system immediately.  First, we do not know what will be the CAP of 2010.  Both
the commitments  made by the EU under GATT (URA) and internal  pressure to reduce budgetary
costs (MacSharry's  reforms) are likely to result in  lower food prices in the EU.  Second,  one should
avoid too high costs of the system (they may create too heavy a burden for the EU budget, and by far
too heavy if Poland is to cover the costs from its own resources  - it must be the case, until Poland
becomes a full member of the EU, Tangermann, 1994). Third, the burden of transfers to farmers
may be relatively higher for Eastern European  consumers  than for Western Europeans,  given much
higher share of food in consumer  expenditures. Fourth, introduction  of a price supporting  system,
even if initially the key parameters  (target prices) are low (as proposed by Nallet and Van Stolk,
1994), is an invitation  to a political game.  The pressure to increase the parameters  may easily make
the system unbearable  for both consumers  and taxpayers. Fifth, agricultural sectors of CEE
countries, and particularly  of Poland, need restructuring. Any system that slows down restructuring
(and an artificially  high level of food prices and farmers' income  does) should be avoided.
Moreover, introducing  price supporting is not panacea  for the integration.  After entering a
single market farmers from CEE countries will have to face strong competition  from much more
efficient  Western Europeans.  If the productivity  gap is not reduced, the Central European, and
especially  Polish farmers will have to compensate  the low productivity  by low labor costs.  Therefore,
and quite paradoxically,  high prices may not translate  into high income after joining the CAP.
The four reports prepared for the DG I  (Mahe, 1994, Buckwell  et al., 1994, Tangermann  et
al., 1994, Tardidi et al., 1994) stress the point that full integration  requires full participation  of the
CEE countries  in the single market (and, therefore, in CAP), but suggest  keeping price support on a
low level until joining the EU as the best strategy. Therefore, increasing  the price level may be
inevitable  at one point; nevertheless,  it is probably not a right, and beyond any doubt not the only
imaginable  strategy  for the pre-accession  period.
7 In fact, a system  of 'green exchange  rates",  special  exchange  rates  that are used  for calculating  national
prices  of basic  products  and may  differ  from  market  exchange  rates, causes  certain  differences  in price  levels
even  within  the EU (Bowler,  1985).Price  Support  at Any Price?  14
3.  Price Support: Timing and Costs
The analysis of the likely effects of various agricultural policy mixes for Poland presented in
chapters 3-5 is based on simulation analysis performed with the use of the CGE model POLAGR.
The model  is solved for
the  19-year period 1991-2010 (in
fact, the agricultural  policy  ....  Box  2. Policy  cost  measures:  :ia  the POLAGR  imodelt
variables are not changed beforepolicy  cost measures
the year  1995).  The base solution  comparable  with the:OECD methdology (OECD,1994,Annex  lII)
of the model (or the steady case)
represents a steady growth path of  Cost for taxpayers  is defined as anet :costof exporting
% (erodution  surpluses  (export subsidies  minus:revenue  from import 4.4 % (yearly average).  In the  .+  E  . . >  ;;E:  ::E: levies) +direct  payments to farmers +  policy  costs not connected
base case, no active agricultural  with  price or income suppo  rt(including investment incentives  for:i.
policy  is applied (the base run  job creation but excluding  social security  payments):
assumes a dynamic continuation of  : 
the situation from  1991, with the
PSE level close to zero).  The  where: E-exports,  P  ;,,,domestic  producer  price, jP,=world
simulation experiments assume  Trice,  M -jimports, DP  diiect payments, PCNPIs  --Poicy
certain agricultural policy mixes  costsnotconnectedwiwth  prceor  income support.
(namely price  supporting, various  Cost for consumers is derived from:  a Consumer Subsidy
forms of income supporting,  Equivalent  (CSE)  conceptuand  is equal  to:
investment  incentives  etc.)..  .....
Deviationsfrom  the base run  c 0 =Qc*(  )
calculatedfor  every experiment  t:where:  QG=volume of consumption.
represent  an evaluation  of the  The  cost is therefore  equal  to  _________i________
agricultural  policy effects (costs  coserelaeossaud a be)by  higher  PDO,:  prices they have
and  benefits).  ~~~~to  pa  for food  (dotte area  ABDE):.
Please note, that the cost is smaller  ;  -
Agricultural policy cost  that the total welfare  Eloss,  caused
measures used the model are  both  bY  higber  preand  y  e  _ the volume Ofconisumtip*on  from  _________
shown in Box 2.  Benefits are  to  c  (area  ABCDE).
measured by the income relation
(a ratio of per capita income of  ;;; Producer  Subsidy  Equivalent  (PSE) ii defined  as:
farmers,  both from farming and  PSE=  (QP(xPw)+DP+oS)*1oO/(Q*PD+DP)
from other sources, to the average
wage), decrease of the number of  where: 0Q. volume  of production.
fPSE  informs what percent of the producers' income from farmingin
f  is due to the price  support or direct income  support.
the macroeconomic impact.  . ..  ..  ...
This section evaluates the effects of various strategies of targeting EU prices level.  The
question we try to answer is: what is the best strategy of approaching EU prices,  that allows to avoid
excessive costs and that is coherent with the URA commitments of Poland?Price  Support  at Any Price?  15
3.1  Targeting  EU prices: how and when?
Series of simulation  experiments  allow to evaluate  effects of various strategies  of targeting EU
prices.  Let us start from formulating  a list of possible options for Poland. The generally  recognized
list of options is as follows  (Tangermann  et al., 1994):
(a)  Fast approach  to the current EU price level, with all budgetary  consequences  (FAST PATH
experiment).
(1')  Fast approach  to the current EU price level, combined  with firm supply controls that allow to
keep budgetary  expenditures  under control. Price support only applies  within production
quotas, while production  in excess of quotas is punished by penalties  (FAST PATH/OUTPUT
REDUCTION  experiment).
(c)  Transition of Poland to common EU prices after the accession, assuming  that a liberal reform
of the CAP takes place and the EU price level is reduced after 2000 (LAST MOMENT
INTEGRATION  experiment).
Every strategy of targeting  EU prices leads to various costs for taxpayers and consumers.
Moreover, every strategy  has its own macroeconomic  impact. Generally speaking,  one may expect
that the earlier the artificial price level is introduced,  the bigger misallocation  of resources and the
slower the path of restructuring  and reducing  the excess  employment  (the income relation has an
evident impact  on farmers' decisions  to move to other activities, particularly in the case of young
farmers, OECD, 1994).
In the FAST PATH experiment,  we have assumed  that the price level in Poland is increased
to the current EU price level by the year 2000.  No output  reductions, or any other constraint is
enforced.
In the FAST PATH/OUTPUT  REDUCTION  experiment, we assume firm quantity controls
(output reductions  from the potential level growing to 10% of the gross output), that allow to keep
total transfers to agriculture  (an aggregate  measure of support)  at a level compatible  with Poland's
commitments  to GATT (below $ 3bn yearly 8, Polish GATT schedules  according  to SAEPR, 1995).
In the LAST MOMENT INTEGRATION  experiment,  we assume that the price adjustment
takes place between  2005 and 2010 (in a transition period, after Poland becomes  a full member of the
EU).  Thanks to the CAP reform, the EU price level in 2005 is assumed  to be lower (differences
between  world prices and EU prices reduced  by 50%).
8  The commitments  as measured  by the Agregate  Measure of Support (AMS).Price  Support  at Any Price?  16
3.2  Targeting EU prices: simulation experiments results
Three experiments lead to different results.  First,  the costs are quite different.
Table 3.1 shows policy costs indicators for three experiments 9 (all the tables show deviations from the
base run).  In line with the OECD  definition,  the total policy cost shown in the third row does not
include an increase in social security payments (covered from the general revenue of the budget).
Tab.3.1  Targeting EU prices
Simulation experiments: POLICY COSTS
Fast path  Fast path/output  Last moment  integration
(EU prices by 2000)  reduction  (50%EU prices by
_  (EU pr.  by 2000, quotas)  2010)
2000  2010  2000  2010  2000 J  2010
In $  billions(9)  prices):
(1) Cost for taxpayers  1.67  5.09  1.00  0.68  0.00  0.35
(2) Cost for consumers  1.55  1.77  1.56  1.81  0.00  0.89




security  expenditures  -0.06  -0.13  -0.06  -0.09  0.00  -0.03
Producer Subsidy
Equivalent  (PSE) in %  33.4%  43.5%  28.8%  23.8%  0.0%  14.1%
Source:  Model POLAGR,  simulation  Jan.1995
The FAST PATH experiment leads to an extreme!  expensive policy.  The total policy costs
reach almost $ 7bn by the year 2010 (PSE on the EU level), violating Poland's  GATT commitments
and putting an unbearable burden  on the taxpayers and consumers.
The high policy costs are not only due to the higher (supported) domestic price  levels.  Other
factors influencing the outcome are both  increased output (supply response to higher prices) and
depressed domestic consumption.  This leads to increase in production surpluses, making  integration
of the Polish agriculture in the CAP of 2010  more costly for the EU budget (production surpluses are
twice as big as in the base run) . Such a phenomenon does not appear in two other scenarios:  In the
FAST PATH/OUTPUT  REDUCTION experiment a slowdown in domestic food consumption is
accompanied by a similar slowdown in domestic output caused by quantity control,  and in the LAST
MOMENT INTEGRATION  experiment domestic food consumption is only slightly lower than in the
base run (in both experiments production surpluses are close to the base run values).
9For a definition of cost  see Box 2.Price Support  at Any Price?  17
The FAST PATH/OUTPUT  REDUCTION experiment  leads to much lower costs (within  the
GATT commitments),  as the production surpluses  remain low and high prices are applied only to
limited production  quotas.  In the LAST MOMENT INTEGRATION  experiment,  policy costs do not
appear before 2005.  However, as
the domestic demand  is relatively
high, and the price  level lower than  Targeting  EU prices
in the other experiments,  policy costs  Policy  cost  ($ billions)
are also much smaller.  VyWwru  wwn
7  Ofld.aodhiec  ¶sWflIoPns  1  iiw(901p  s
Figure 6 presents a  6
comparison  of policy costs in the  5  /
three experiments. The FAST PATH
experiment  appears infeasible,  as  4  Fast  patl/output  reduct.
costs are exploding.  Therefore, only  3  Last  moment  integration
the FAST PATH/OUTPUT  2 -
REDUCTION experiment  may be  1  .
treated  as a feasible  scenario for a
fast path of price level adjustment  1 190  191  20106~i-'
(the cost stabilizes  on an acceptable  I_I
level).  The last experiment  does not  Figure  6
cause, by definition, any costs
before Poland's accession  to the EU (by that time, a big part of costs is likely to be covered by the
common  CAP budget). The costs in 2010 are lower than in the other scenarios,  mainly because of a
lower level of EU prices.  However, a part of cost reduction  comes also from a slightly higher level
of the personal income, that leads to bigger domestic consumption  of food and reduces  production
surpluses.
The next figure shows a
comparison  of the policy results with  Targeting  EU prioes
respect to the income relation (one of  Income  relation
the primary  policy targets).  The best  70  VW se  bw  V  %
improvement is obtained in the FAST  70
PATH experiment  (the income  60
relation 50% above the base run  Fast path
level). However, such a result  F  a  te
requires unbearable costs.  A feasible  30Fr
variant (FAST PATH/OUTPUT  20  Last  moment  Integration
REDUCTION)  stabilizes  the income  10
relation  on a level 20% above  the  0  ,
base run.  Exactly the same result is  -10  20
obtained  by the year 2010 in the
LAST MOMENT INTEGRATION
experiment.  Figure  7Price Support at Any Price?  18
Table 3.2 gives basic characteristics  of the impact of various paths of EU prices targeting  on
the agricultural  sector.
Tab.3.2 Targeting  EU prices
Simulation  experiments:  POLICY EFFECTS
Fast path  Fast path/output  Last moment integration
(EU prices by 2000)  reduction  (50%EU prices  by
(EU pr.  by 2000,  quotas)  2010)
2000  2010  2000  [  2010  2000  J  2010
Income Relation
(farmer's  income/wage)
index, 91 level=100  142.9  172.4  134.1  133.9  108.3  131.6
index, base sol.=100  131.9  155.6  123.8  120.3  100.0  118.7
Number of farmers
in millions  3.085  2.780  3.084  2.651  2.894  2.416
index, base sol.=100  106.6  115.1  106.6  109.7  100.0  100-0
Employment  in
agriculture as  % of total  18.1%  17.3%  15.8%
Average  farm area
in hectares  6.7  7.4  6.7  7.8  7.2  8.6
index, base sol.=  100  93.8  86.9  93.8  91.1  100.0  100.0
Output per  farmer
index, 91 level=100  126.3  216.4  118.4  164.1  131.9  184.6
index, base sol. = 100  95.7  117.2  89.7  88.9  100.0  100.0
Source: Model POLAGR,  simulation Jan.1995
The path of reduction in the number of farmers (27% reduction  in the base run), remains the
same in the LAST MOMENT  INTEGRATION  experiments,  but slows down considerably  in both
FAST PATH and FAST PATH/OUTPUT  REDUCTION  experiments  (the number of farmers in 2010
is, respectively,  15% and 10% above  the base run).  Consequently,  the average farm area grows only
to 7.4-7.8 ha (in the base run 8.6 ha).  An artificially  supported  high income relation  creates a major
disincentive  for the labor mobility in agriculture,  discouraging  farmers from searching  for a job
outside farming.
The output per farmer value increases  considerably  in the FAST PATH (a supply response,
leading to production  surpluses  and unbearable  costs), and falls in the FAST PATH/OUTPUT
REDUCTION  experiment  (10% below the base run).  This means that both FAST PATH experiments
lead to undesirable  effects: either a slowdown  in reduction in the number of farmers is accoinpanied
by huge production  surpluses, or by a significant  fall of productivity. It means, that restructuring  of
Polish agriculture  is considerably  slowed down by both FAST PATH experiments  - a technical
reduction  of policy costs through quantity controls  makes the policy feasible from the financial  (and
GATT)  point of view, but does not eliminate  a general harmful  impact on structural changes.Price Support  at Any Price?  19
The quantity control necessary  to curb the supply response should be quite severe: the  FAST
PATH/OUTPUT  REDUCTION  experiment  leads  to an output level that is more than 25  % percent
below the FAST PAST scenario  level (and 3 % below the base run, despite much higher prices).
Table 3.3 presents the macroeconomic  impact  of the policies applied in the experiments.
Tab.3.3 Targeting  EU prices
Simulation  experiments:  MACROECONOMIC  IMPACT
Fast path  Fast path/output  Last moment  integration
(EU prices by 2000)  reduction  (50%EU  prices by
(EU pr.  by 2000, quotas)  2010)
Index  growth  Index  growth  Index  growth
2010  rate  2010  rate  2010  rate
(base=  100  (aver.)  (base= 100  (aver.)  (base= 100  (aver)
|  )  1991-2010  )  1991-2010  )  1991-
2010
Gross Domestic  96.8  4.2%  97.1  4.2%  100.1  4.4%
Product  I  l
Fixed Capital  Formation  77.0  5.6%  89.1  6.4%  98.0  6.9%
Personal Consumption  102.1  3.8%  98.8  3.7%  100.4  3.7%
of which:l
Food products  97.3  1.5%  95.5  1.4%  98.2  1.6%
Other goods & services  103.5  4.7%  99.8  4.5%  101.1  4.6%
Source:  Model POLAGR,  simulation  Jan.  1995
The impact on fixed capital  Targeting  EU prices
formation is negative in all the  I  on GDp
experiments,  while the impact  on the  Impact  on  GDP
DgvigWo  frum  tU bm  run  In  % level of  personal  consumption  varies  to6  Ddlx  l  n
(the level lower than in the base run  5 Jl
only in the FAST PATH/OUTPUT  4 J 
REDUCTION experiment).  While  3  Fast path
the FAST PATH experiment  mainly  2-  t  _  r
affects investment, the  FAST  1  --
PATH/OUTPUT  REDUCTION  0  - Last  moment  IntegraIon
experiment has a more equally  -2
distributed  negative  impact on the  -2
final demand components. The  10.3
macroeconomic policy impact in the  111
LAST MOMENT INTEGRATION  is
not significant  (the policy does not  Figure  8
begin before 2005).Price Support at Any Price?  20
Both experiments  connected  with a fast price level growth lead to serious macroeconomic
efficiency  losses, mainly due to misallocation  of resources. Generally  speaking,  both experiments
lead to a shift from saving and investment  to consumption. The impact on the long-term  growth rate
of GDP is similar, reaching 0.2 per cent points (3% loss of a potential  GDP by 2010).  Figure 8
shows that both fast path experiments  lead to analogous  macroeconomic  losses (the LAST MOMENT
INTEGRATION  experiment  is almost neutral from that point of view, as price supporting  does not
influence  macroeconomic  variables  before the end of the projection  period'°).
A shift from saving to consumption  in both FAST PATH experiments  is a result of several
factors. First, high budgetary  spending  on export subsidies  result in higher deficits that reduce
savings of the govermment.  Second, lower level of the disposable  income of population  (except
farmers) and higher expenditures  on food  lead to reduction  of households' savings. Growth of
savings of farmers, especially  in the FAST PATH scenario, may partly compensate  for this fall.
However, a bulk of farmers' savings is reinvested  in the agricultural sector. Therefore the overall
capital mobility  decreases  and serious misallocation  of resources  appears (excessive  investment  in
agriculture  crowds out more productive investment  in other sectors; moreover, excessive  investment
in agriculture  causes further development  of production  surpluses  leading to deficits growth). Third,
the enterprise sector is hurt by higher prices of agricultural  inputs (therefore, interests of farmers and
of the food processing  industry turn out to be contradictory"). Fourth, high production  surpluses in
agriculture increase  net exports, reducing a possible absorption  of foreign savings.
The experiments  lead to a set of conclusions:
(a)  Fast move towards the EU price level through price support leads to heavy policy costs (for
taxpayers and consumers). To make the policy financially  feasible, firm quantity controls
must be introduced.
(b)  High levels of price supporting will also have severe macroeconomic  and sectoral
consequences. The macroeconomic  losses may be estimated  on 0.2 per cent points of a yearly
GDP growth. The structural change in agriculture, and - first of all - a pattern of reduction
of the excess employment  will be significantly  slowed  down.
(c)  Keeping  price level low until the end of the accession  process allows to avoid creating  a threat
for the structural change and economic  growth in a critical period of 1995-2005,  and seems to
be a preferable  strategy of targeting  the EU price level.  Poland avoids paying high
intermediate  costs in the period 1991-2005  and better prepares its agriculture for entering the
single market.
10 One  may  ask a question,  to what  extent  the results  of the LAST  MOMENT  INTEGRATION  experiment
are trivial  showing  simply  that  if Poland  does  not introduce  price  supporting  before  the last moment,  it will  not
have  to pay the interim  costs. What  we wanted  to show,  however,  was  that thanks  to 20 years  of an
undisturbed  structural  change  the agricultural  sector  will  be much  better  prepared  to accept  the price supporting
by 2005-2010.  Therefore  the costs  (both  sectoral  and macroeconomic)  are likely  to be smaller  than  today.
"  The  food  processing  industry  may  not realize  it immediately,  as high tariffs  for food  create  an illusion  of
defending  both  domestic  farmers  and the domestic  food  processing  industry.Price Support at Any Price?  21
4. Are There Alternatives to Price Support?
This section discusses  the likely effects  of introducing  agricultural  policies that do not support
prices (for the moment, we forget about the EU integration  matters). The main option that we would
like to discuss is investing  money in accelerating  the structural  change instead of supporting  prices
and incomes. The alternative  agricultural  policies, provided  they speed up structural changes, may
be considered  as more appropriate  strategies  than price supporting  for the interim  period 1991-2005,
before Polish agriculture  fully  joins the CAP.
4.1 Alternatives to price support: possible options
The income  relation, and particularly  the farmers' average income  may be supported in two
ways.  The first, discussed  above, is to increase  total agricultural income (through price support).
Even if the sectoral impact of the policy is negative,  and the number of farmers increases  (compared
to the base run), the average income and the income relation is likely to grow (generally  speaking,  at
the expense  of taxpayers  and consumers).
The second way of increasing  the average farmers' income, is reducing  the number  of farmers
below the base run level (with stable total agricultural  incomes). This section presents two simulation
experiments:
(a)  Reducing  the number  of farmers through faster retirement  of old farmers (MORE
PENSIONERS  experiment);  costs of higher pension payments  will have to be financed from
general revenues  of the budget.
(b)  Collecting  additional  indirect  taxes (on all products, not only food) for supporting  the
structural change in agriculture  (that add up to the maximum  amnount  coherent with Poland's
GATT commitments)  and investing  them in promoting  outflow of farmers from agriculture  to
other activities in rural areas (JOB PROMOTION  FOR FARMERS  experiment).
The first experiment  (MORE PENSIONERS  experiment)  shows  a policy that has a limited
scope.  The age structure of Polish farmers differs for the dynamic sector and the stagnating sector (in
the stagnating  sector, the average age of farmers is 6 years higher than in the dynamic  sector, Hunek,
1995). Therefore, an accelerated  retirement (that leads  to lowering  the maximal  age of farmers by 5
years) means elimination  of the smallest and the weakest  farms of the stagnating  sector.  Given a long
period of the policy application  (15 years), the production  factors (mainly land) may be easily
absorbed by the dynamic sector without any losses of output (and with possible efficiency  gains, that
we ignore in the experiment). We ignore the problem, what policies should  be applied to encourage
old farmers to retire (the relative level of pension remains low and stable).  Let us also note, that the
early retirement schemes  are frequently  critizied as solutions  to the overemployment  in downsizing
sectors, creating  a risk for the stability  of the public pension system (The World Bank, 1994). In the
case of the Polish agriculture,  however, we are not talking about the "early" retirement, but about
encouragement  to retire for people above  the normal retirement  age.  As the productivity  of thesePrice Support at Any Price?  22
people is very low, their retirement may free some assets (namely land) for a more efficient use.
Moreover, a limited size of the group of farmers that may be encouraged to retire,  together with a
low level of pensions should not create major threats for the stability of the public pension system.
The second experiment (JOB PROMOTION FOR FARMERS experiment) takes advantage of
a low level of rural development in Poland.  We assume, that a mix of appropriate tax policy and
public investment  policy (investment incentives for jobs creation in rural areas, market services
promotion,  development of budget supported non-market services) together with a vocational training
and a strong support for infant business,  may allow for creating a significant number of jobs in rural
areas over a  15-20 years period (supporting also the demand for newly created output).  The
budgetary cost of creating a job that was assumed in the experiment,  was equal to 90% of the fixed
assets value per employee in the service sector (in consecutive years)'2. Again, we assume that
mainly farmers from the stagnating sector take new jobs'3 (with the exemption of the old ones), and
therefore the production factors are absorbed by the other farms.
A policy of supporting outflow of farmers from agriculture to other activities  may provoke  a
lot of problems.  Using active labor market policies for restructuring sectors with overemployment is
not considered as the most  preferable policy, mainly because of undesirable disincentive effects on
the labor market.  Policies of job creation are also considered as economically difficult and politically
sensitive (The World Bank,  1994a).  At the same time, however, a problem of downsizing
employment in the farming sector requires a special treatment.  First, the outflow of farmers  from
agriculture through normal labor market channels will not be easy, as the farmers do not have
required labor skills.  Second, the labor mobility in this sector is very low, so the market incentives
would have to be very strong to make farmers seek for other jobs.  Third, the natural channel of
going out of agriculture would be moving to cities in a search for employment opportunities.  Such
developments could increase significantly the unemployment pressure  in cities, and may lead to
undesirable social tensions.  Fourth, it would not allow for a fast development of the physical and
social infrastructure needed for growth in the rural areas.
In the JOB PROMOTION experiment we assume that the process of moving farmers out of
agriculture will have to be based on the market (by encouraging business to create jobs  in the rural
areas).  However, a strong support  will have to be given to vocational training,  increasing labor
mobility,  supporting entrepreneurship  and  developing physical and social infrastructure in the rural
areas.  The macroeconomic sense of such a policy is to  promote growth of the market services
sector in the rural areas (promoting both supply and demand for market services) and to create
12 Choosing  this ratio below 100% indicates  our assumption  that the new jobs, although  highly subsidized,
are to be created mainly by the private sector on market  basis.  The remaining  part of costs of jobs creation, as
well as the running costs once the jobs are created, are to be covered by business activities.
13The farmers from stagnating  sector have generally worse labor profile that farmers  from developing  sector
(higher average age, less skills). However, as their income from farming is low, they may be more eager to
exchange  it for a wage income that is also low, but more stable and secure.  The farmers from stagnating  sector
will be only able to apply for jobs that require simple skills (a special  vocational  training may help a bit).Price Support  at Any Price?  23
incentives for choosing labor-intensive technologies, making use of relatively low skilled labor.  Let
us also note, that the process may quickly create a positive feedback:  growth of income in rural
areas will create additional demand necessary to absorb the newly created output.
In this paper we do not make any particular proposal of the policy mix for accelerating
reduction of employment in agriculture.  We tend to believe, that such a mix may be created, and
may work in the long run (we are talking about a program for  15-20 years).  Its main target would be
not to replace the market, but to help market solve a socially and politically sensitive problem of
moving farmers out of agriculture" 4.
The main question we try to answer in this section  is what would be the impact of a
successful policy of speeding up process  of employment reduction in agriculture on the income
relation and restructuring Polish agriculture.  In other words, we try to find out what would happen
to Polish agriculture if resources  that may be spent on price supporting  are,  instead, invested
outside the agricultural sector. The main target of the job promotion  program is therefore not to
create new jobs, but to encourage and to channel a flow of new investment towards  the rural areas
and towards low-skilled labor intensive technologies (that fit the labor supply of farmers).
Both experiments are compared with results of the feasible price supporting policy (results of
the FAST PATH/OUTPUT  REDUCTION  experiment).
4.2 Alternatives to price support: simulation experiments
Policy costs are calculated differently in the experiments.  While the MORE PENSIONERS
experiment provokes only higher social security spending, the JOB PROMOTION FOR FARMERS
needs financing by taxpayers, at a level comparable with the maximal support agreed under URA.
14 A target for the JOBS  PROMOTION  FOR FARMERS  experiment  is more than doubling  the average
yearly fall of employment  in agriculture  from 1.6% in the base run to 3.5-4% over a 20 years period.  The base
run figure is broadly  in line  with Polish  experience  in 1967-90  (1.2% yearly  fall). Increasing  the rate  would  require
a substantial  effort, particularly  in an economy with  high initial  urban unemployment  rate (that is why we assume
that a supporting  policy  mix is necessary). However,  the target rate is similar  to rates of reduction  of employment
in agriculture  observed in the most succesful EU countries in the period 1967-90  (Germany  3.8% yearly fall,
Belgium  3.5%, Denmark  4.4%, Eurostat data).Price Support  at Any Price?  24
Tab.4.1  Alternatives for price supporting
Simulation experiments: POLICY  COSTS
Fast path/output  More pensioners  Jobs promotion  for
reduction  farmers
(EU pr.  by 2000, quotas)
2000  2010  2000  J  2010  2000  1  2010
In $  billions(91  prices):
(1) Cost for taxpayers  1.00  0.68  0.00  0.00  2.91  1.96
(2) Cost for consumers  1.56  1.81  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
Total cost (1)+(2)  2.56  2.49  0.00  0.00  2.91  1.96
(excl.social  security)
Increase of social
security expenditures  -0.06  -0.09  0.10  0.23  -0.00  0.01
Producer  Subsidy
Equivalent  (PSE) in %  28.8%  23.8%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%
Source:  Model POLAGR,  simulation  Jan.1995
As both table 4.1 and
figure 9 show,  the  level  of  costs  in  Alternatives  to price  support
the  JOB  PROMOTION  FOR  Policy cost ($  billions)
FARMERS experiment remains  No  O,m
similar to the price supporting costs.  -
However, the shape of the line is  6
quite different:  the investment  5  prnxoton  for  farmers
experiment assumes a 15 year
investment program.  After the end  3
of the program (in 2010),  More  pensioners
expenditure falls to zero.  In  2  /
contrast, the price support  only  I  /
freezes the expenditure level (the
structural  production  surpluses are  1  1 1  2  0
small thanks to output control,  but
costs for consumers  remain high).  Figure  9
The MORE PENSIONERS
experiment entails a relatively small budgetary  cost".
15  Relatively  small budgetary  costs result from a low ratio between an average pension for farmers and
average wage (below  40% in 1993). If the increase  of this ratio is necessary to encourage  old farmers to retire,
the cost for social security will increase.Price Support  at Any Price?  25
Figure 10 shows effects of
experiments on the income relation.  Alternatives  to price  support
The income of the  MORE  Income  relation
PENSIONERS experiment is  WM,  ft m  ft  bat nm  h %
relatively small, but positive (a scope  70 - f  S nmms
of the policy is reduced  by the age  60
structure of farmers). However, the  50
JOB PROMOTION  FOR FARMERS  40  Jobs  prondon  kw  hmer
experiment successfully competes  30  ,  Fat patVouiut  reduct
with price support in increasing  the  20  More  pensiors
income relation, although it is only  10  /  - '
after 2005 that the income relation in  --
both experiments is similar.  -10  ,  . 2
Moreover, the positive policy effect  10  1sb6  i06  A1
increases  over time: the structural
problems  that keep the relation low  Figure  10
are being  solved,  not only
counteracted. This is thanks to the positive effects that the experiment  (and, to a smaller degree, also
the MORE PENSIONERS  experiment)  has on accelerating  the structural change  in the agricultural
sector.  Table 4.2  presents main indicators of this change.
Tab.4.2 Alternatives  for price  supporting
Simulation  experiments:  POLICY  EFFECTS
Fast path/output  More pensioners  Jobs promotion  for
reduction  farmers
(EU  pr.  by  2000,  quotas)  l
l________________  1  2000  j  2010  2000  2010  2000  T 2010
Income  Relation
(farmer's income/wage)
index, 91 level=100  134.1  133.9  111.4  118.2  116.3  141.6
index, base sol.= 100  123.8  120.3  102.9  106.7  107.1  127.8
Number  of farmers
in millions  3.084  2.651  2.775  2.180  2.519  1.542
index, base sol.=100  106.6  109.7  95.9  90.2  87.0  63.8
Employment  in
agriculture  as % of total  17.3%  14.2%  10.1%
Average  farm area
in hectares  6.7  7.8  7.5  9.5  8.2  13.4
index, base sol.  = 100  93.8  91.1  104.3  110.8  114.9  156.7
Output  per  farmer
index, 91 level= 100  118.4  164.1  137.6  204.6  151.6  289.1
index, base sol.= 100  89.7  88.9  104.3  110.8  114.9  156.6
Source:  Model  POLAGR,  simulation  Jan.1995Price Support  at Any Price?  26
The JOB PROMOTION  FOR FARMERS  experiment  results in a 55 % reduction  of the
number of farmers  (almost 4% yearly, a number  broadly in line with the experience  of EU countries
that have enjoyed the fastest reduction  of the farm employment  in the period 1965-90,  Poczta 1994).
Farm employment  in 2010 is about 1/3 lower than in the base run.  The share of farmers in total
employment  falls to a reasonable 10% level. The  MORE PENSIONERS  experiment  gives a much
smaller, but also significant  result of decreasing  the number of farmers by 10% (compared  with the
base run).
Thanks to the reduction of the number of fanners, the average  farm area grows to 9.5 ha
(MORE  PENSIONERS)  or even 13.4 ha (JOB PROMOTION  FOR FARMERS)  - quite satisfactory
results by current EU standards. Let us remember  that the price support system allowed  only for an
increase  of the farm area to 7.8 ha (the base run area was 8.6 ha).
Both scenarios  increase significantly  the labor productivity  in agriculture  (by 10% in the
MORE PENSIONERS  experiment,  by more than 50% in (the JOB PROMOTION  FOR FARMERS
experiment). In the second  experiment, the agricultural  sector seems to find its equilibrium  position,
at which no artificial support is needed  to allow for a reasonable  incorne  relation  level.  The gap in
labor productivity  between  the agriculture  and the non agricultural  sectors shrinks to a level, at which
agriculture  can successfully  compete  with other sectors in generating  income per employee  (results of
the MORE PENSIONERS  experiment,  although much more modest, are encouraging  as well).
Table 4.3 gives an overview  of macroeconomic  effects  generated  by the experiments.
Tab.4.3 Alternatives  for price supporting
Simulation  experiments:  MACROECONOMIC  IMPACT
Fast path/output  More pensioners  Jobs promotion for
r -duction  farmers
(EU pr.  I y 2000,  quotas)
Index  growth  Index  growth  Index  growth
2010  rate  2010  rate  2010  rate
(base9  100  (aver.)  (base= 100  (aver.)  (base= 100  (aver)
1991-2010  1991-2010  as9190(a-
_  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _ _  _  _  _ _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  20 10
Gross Domestic  97.1  4.2%  101.7  4.5%  105.2  4.6%
Product
Fixed Capital Formation  89.1  6.4%  105.0  7.3%  113.8  7.8%
Personal Consumption  98.8  3.7%  100.6  3.8%  104.7  4.0%
of which:
Food products  95.5  1.4%  100.2  1.7%  101.6  1.7%
Other goods & services  99.8  4.5%  100.8  4.6%  105.7  4.9%
Source: Model  POLAGR,  simulation  Jan.1995Price Support  at Any Price?  27
Both experiments  have a common, positive impact  on savings and investment  (effect in 2010
ranging from 5% in the MORE PENSIONERS  experiment  to 14% in the JOB PROMOTION  FOR
FARMERS;  the price support gave a reverse result). Let us note, however, that a higher level of
saving in the MORE PENSIONERS  experiment  is mainly caused by higher foreign savings (smaller
trade surpluses). Low food price level causes consumption  of food to exceed the base run level. Such
a result leads to a decreased  scale of production  surpluses. Consumption  levels are higher than in the
base run also in the case of other goods and services (thanks  to higher incomes, particularly in the
JOB PROMOTION  FOR FARMERS  experiments).
The overall impact on GDP
is positive in both experiments.  The  Alternatives  to  price  support
long term growth rate increases  (by  Impact on  GDP
less than 0.1 per cent point compared  Deun  ftm th be  run  In %
to the base run) in the MORE  6 -
PENSIONERS experiment.  The  4  ,,
experiment  of JOBS PROMOTION  po
FOR FARMERS leads to a  2
significant, more than 0.2 per  cent  Fast  padoutput  reduct.
point increase of the average growth  0  - More  pensIoners
rate (from 4.4% in the base run to
4.6% in the experiment). Figure 11  -2
shows that both alternative  scenarios  -4
give much more desirable  - 1 i6  A  i"  1  o
macroeconomic  effect than price
support.  Figure  11
Several  factors contribute  to a generally  positive outcome of both scenarios.  First, higher
level of personal income leads to higher savings of households  (despite a fact, that an increased  labor
supply in the JOB PROMOTION  FOR FARMERS  experiment  makes a downward  pressure on
wages). Initial negative  effect of higher indirect  taxes on urban households' savings is offset by both
the increase  of rural households' savings and by the higher economic  growth (it means, however, that
at least initially, before the higher growth effects appear, the program of job promotion is financed  by
urban households).  Second, fiscal deficits are under control:  the deficit increase slightly in the
MORE PENSIONERS  experiment,  and decrease considerably  in  the JOB PROMOTION  FOR
FARMERS  experiment. Third, firms' saving grow in both scenarios. Fourth, higher domestic food
consumption  reduces production  surpluses,  and allows for absorption of bigger foreign savings.Price Support  at Any Price?  28
Some conclusions  may be drawn from the simulation  analysis:
(a)  Accelerating reduction of agricultural  employment  may allow for an improvement  of the
income relation  on a scale similar to the price supporting. Obtaining  such results takes more
time, but the improvement  seems to be more solid.
(b)  Reducing  agricultural employment  represents  solving the problems rather than counteracting
it.  Significant  progress may be obtained  in restructuring  the agricultural  sector.
(c)  The overall macroeconomic  impact of the policy is positive.  However, the costs for urban
households  may be quite high, at least before the higher growth effects  appear.Price Support at Any Price?  29
5. European  Integration  Scenarios
This section discusses possible (and financially feasible) scenarios of integrating the Polish
agricultural  sector with the EU agriculture.  The scenarios take into account conclusions that may be
drawn from the simulation experiments  described in sections 3 and 4.  The scenarios also take into
account following observations:
(a)  An automatic and rapid extension of the CAP price  supporting system to the Polish
agriculture would cause high budgetary costs, that will have to be covered by Poland until the
accession.  Moreover, high costs of the eventual Poland's  membership create a risk of
delaying it by many years.
(b)  The CAP itself is changing.  The changes are likely to result in  lower food prices in the EU.
The biggest error  the CEE countries could make is overshooting - setting prices on a too high
level, and being unable to push them down when the EU will be doing it.
(c)  Introduction of the price supporting system can not break commitments made by the CEE
countries in a framework of URA of GATT.
(d)  The main budgetary cost of the CAP is connected with the disposal of production surpluses
(by building up stocks or subsidizing exports).  Therefore,  the policy cost in CEE countries
would depend to a large extent on the scale of the surpluses.  A policy of high prices may
depress domestic demand,  and lead to even higher surpluses and costs.
(e)  A principle of the agricultural policy for Poland is to avoid measures that slow down
restructuring of the farning  sector (as the experiments show,  price supporting does).
5.1 Integration  scenarios: in a search of feasible paths
The simulations described above suggest that the following guidelines should be adopted in
constructing a feasible path of integration:
(a)  The pre-accession and transition period should be devoted to solving the structural problems,
not to counteracting their effects.  Therefore, all disposable resources should be spent on
promoting  creation of jobs for farmers and reducing farm employment rather than on price
supporting.
(b)  Obtaining the EU price level is a necessary precondition of joining the single market.
However, the most desirable (and the cheapest) strategy should be based on increasing price
level as late as possible,  taking advantage of the likely liberal reforms of the CAP.  The
policies that reduce production surpluses are crucial to make the eventual price  supporting
system affordable.
(c)  Reducing agricultural employment by  incentives to retirement of old farmers seems to be a
relatively cheap and effective tool that helps solving structural problems of Polish agriculture.
Generally speaking,  if the nation decides to transfer resources to the agricultural sector,  the
resources should be used efficiently.  The main target of a pre-accession policy should be to reduce
the gap between the agriculture of Poland and the EU rather than to support  prices and incomes.Price Support at Any Price?  30
Such analysis  leads us to construct  two gradual integration  scenarios:
(a)  The FULL FINANCING  scenario assumes  that the nation decides  to allow for transfers to the
agricultural  sector (collected  by increasing  indirect taxes) that reach the maximal total transfer
level agreed within the GATT (equal  to total policy costs in the feasible  price supporting
policy presented in the FAST PATH/OUTPUT  REDUCTION  experiment).  Let us remind,
that as previous experiments  show, such a policy may be, at least initially, quite costly for
urban households  (less costly, however, than price supporting).
(b)  The BUDGET  CONSTRAINED  scenario assumes  that the disposable  funds are equal to costs
for taxpayers in the feasible  price supporting  policy, and therefore considerably  reduced.
Both the scenarios  assume the same policy mix: encouraging  old farmers to retire (as in the
MORE PENSIONERS  experiment),  promoting  rural job creation (as in the JOB PROMOTION  FOR
FARMERS  experiment),  avoiding  price supporting  schemes  until the moment of integration  into CAP
(as in the LAST MOMENT INTEGRATION  scenario). The only difference  is the scale of resources
that may be used (the BUDGET  CONSTRAINED  scenario  represents  the same policy that the FULL
FINANCING,  realized with a considerably  smaller financing).
5.2 Integration scenarios: simulation experiments
The policy costs of both scenarios  are presented  in table 5.1.  The costs reach an assumed
level in the period 1995-2005. It is only in the last years of the scenario  that additional  costs for
consumers  appear because  of targeting  EU price level.
Tab.5.1 EU membership - adjustment path
Simulation  experiments:  POLICY  COSTS
Fast path/output  Gradual integration  |  Gradual integration
reduction  full financing  budget constrained
(EU pr.  by 2000, quotas)
l____________________  2000  j  2010  2000  2010  2000  J  2010
In $  billions(91  prices):
(1) Cost for taxpayers  1.00  0.68  2.91  1.35  1.16  1.58
(2) Cost for consumers  1.56  1.81  0.00  0.86  0.00  0.88
Total cost (1)+(2)  2.56  2.49  2.91  2.21  1.16  2.46
(excl.social  security)
Increase of social
security expenditures  -0.06  -0.09  |  0.05  0.14  0.05  0.14
Producer  Subsidy
Equivalent (PSE) in %  28.8%  23.8%  0.0%  13.7%  0.0%  14.4%
Source:  Model POLAGR,  simulation  Jan.1995Price Support  at Any Price?  31
Figure 12 shows the total
policy  costs  comparison.  EU  membership  - adjustment  path
Expenditures  are growing quickly in  Policy COSt  ($ billions)
the case  of  the  FULL  FINANCING  7_______
scenario  (to the maximum  level
feasible under URA).  In the case of  6
the BUDGET CONSTRAINT  5  I  Gradual  Intful  finanadng
scenario a fast increase of costs does  4 -Fast  paVout  rsduc.
not  appear  before  the  year  2000.
Approaching  the  EU  price  level  3  Grdual  intbudget  const.
around  2010,  although  costly  for  2
consumers,  does  not provoke  1  G  lu  ,
additional  big  costs  for taxpayers,  as  O - 2  -
both  scenarios  lead  to  small
production  surpluses.
Figure  12
Figure  13 shows  a very  EU membership  -adjustment  path
positive  impact of both scenarios on  Income  relation
the  income  relation.  The  positive  DaMfnDbmn  %
effect  is obtained  mainly  due  to  a  70  'rn  vwu'
reduction  of  the  number  of farners,  60
that  leads  to an  increase  in average  50
income.  In the  period  2005-2010,  Gradual  Int,full  flnanadng
the  agricultural  income  is additionally  4  Fast patoutput  reduct
enhanced  by  introducing  a price  30
support  system.  Additionally,  one  20  Gradul In,budget  osr.
should  take  into account  the  fact  that  10 -
an  increased  supply  of  labor  0
(obtained  due  to a  massive  shift  of  -10  .l  l  i  i"  20WIO
farmers  to the  non-farming  activities  I  1b  I
leads  to  a slight  lowering  of the  wage  Figure  13
(in  both  scenarios,  compared  to the
base  run).  Such  a  situation  improves  even more  the  income  relation,  and  leads  to  a higher  level  of
competitiveness  of  Polish  industrial  exports  on  the  EU  markets  (finding  a general  balance  of payments
equilibrium  may  play  a crucial  role  in the  transition  period  to  the  full  EU  membership  (Czyzewski,
Orlowski,  Zienkowski,  1993b).Price Support  at Any Price?  32
Table 5.2 summarizes  main achievements  in restructuring the Polish agriculture.
Tab.5.2 EU membership  - adjustment  path
Simulation  experiments:  POLICY  EFFECTS
Fast path/output  Gradual integration  Gradual integration
reduction  full financing  budget constrained
(EU pr.  by 2000, quotas)
2000  F  2010  2000  2010  2000  7  2010
Income Relation
(farmer's  income/wage)
index, 91 level=100  134.1  133.9  117.8  178.4  111.9  151.5
index, base sol.=100  123.8  120.3  108.8  161.0  103.3  136.8
Number  of farmers
in millions  3.084  2.651  2.487  1.508  2.738  1.922
index, base sol.=100  106.6  109.7  85.9  62.4  94.6  79.6
Employment  in
agriculture  as % of total  17.3%  9.9%  12.6%
Average  farm area
in hectares  6.7  7.8  8.3  13.7  7.6  10.8
index, base sol.=100  93.8  91.1  116.4  160.2  105.7  125.7
Output  per  farmer
index, 91 level= 100  118.4  164.1  153.5  296.1  139.5  232.4
l  index, base sol.= 100  _  89.7  88.9  116.4  160.4  105.7  125.9
Source:  Model POLAGR,  simulation  Jan.1995
The FULL FINANCING  scenario  leads to an equilibrium  position of the agricultural sector
characterized  by less than 10% of total employment,  a share that allows for avoiding a big gap in
iabor productivity  between  agriculture  and non agricultural  sectors.  The number  of farmers is
reduced by two thirds, and the productivity  tripled (a result 60% above the base run level).  The
average farm area grows to 13.7 ha (in the base run 8.6 ha, in the feasible  price supporting  policy
experiment  7.8 ha).
The BUDGET  CONSTRAINT  scenario leads to similar, but much more modest results (25  %
productivity  growth, farm area 10.8 ha).
Both scenarios  (and particularly  the FULL FINANCING  scenario)  allow for a big reduction
of the initial gap between  agricultural  sectors of Poland and the EU.  They both also have a positive
macroeconomic  impact, shown in table 5.3.Price Support  at Any Price?  33
Tab.5.3  EU membership - adjustment path
Simulation experiments: MACROECONOMIC IMPACT
Fast path/output  Gradual integration  Gradual integration
reduction  full financing  budget constrained
(EU  pr.  by  2000,  quotas)
Index  growth  Index  growth  Index  growth
2010  rate  2010  rate  2010  rate
(base= 100  (aver.)  (base= 100  (aver.)  (base= 100  (aver)
l  __________________  )________  1  99___  _  1 -20  1 0  )  1  1991201991-2010  19  2091-
Gross Domestic  97.1  4.2%  105.6  4.7%  103.1  4.5%
Product
Fixed Capital Formation  89.1  6.4%  113.2  7.7%  106.2  7.4%
Personal Consumption  98.8  3.7%  104.8  4.0%  102.5  3.9%
of which:
Food products  95.5  1.4%  99.7  1.6%  98.9  1.6%
Other goods &  services  99.8  4.5%  106.4  4.9%70  103.6  4.8%
Source:  Model POLAGR,  simulation  Jan.  1995
Both scenarios lead to significantly higher levels of savings and investment.  Also
consumption levels are higher than  in the base run (the food consumption slightly below the base run
levels is compensated by much higher consumption of other goods and services).  A relatively richer
society may afford more expensive food: the fall of domestic food consumption (with respect to the
base run) is not big,  and a scale of production surpluses significantly lower than in the base run.
Figure  14 shows an overall  EU  membership  - adjustment  path
positive macroeconomic  impact of  Im  pact  on  GDP
both integration scenarios.  In the
case of the BUDGET  DIAgb  from  go  bnm  In  %
CONSTRAINED  scenario the impact  6 l
is smaller, reaching almost an  4
additional 0.2 per cent point of the  /  - Gradual  lntfull  flnanadng
economic growth.  In the case of the  2  - a  _  1
FULL FINANCING,  however,  the  |
macroeconomic gains exceed 0.3 per  0  °  Gradual  lnt,budgetconstr.
cent points of an additional  yearly
GDP growth.  Such an outcome is  -2
Fig  e  41  ,  ,  ,  I
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caused by higher savings  of households' 6, firms, government  and rest of world, resulting mainly from
the higher economic  growth and lower production  surpluses.
Some conclusions  that may be drawn from the scenario analysis:
(a)  The pre-accession  and transition period policy aimed at reducing  the excess employment  in the
Polish agriculture  allows for a significant  reducing  of the productivity  gap between
agricultural  sectors of Poland and the EU.  It creates a basis for the successful  integration  and
competition  on the single  market.
(b)  Obtaining  such results require financing  reaching below $ 3bn per year, i.e. Poland's
aggregate  GATT commitment. Smaller scale financing  will also lead to positive effects, but
of a more modest scope.
(c)  The costs connected  to reaching the EU price level and joining the single market depend
mainly on a scale of production  surpluses. Therefore, a pre-accession  price policy that
stimulates  the supply response  and reduces  domestic  demand makes the integration  process
much more costly.
'6With the exemption of initially smaller income and savings  of urban households,  particularly  in the FULL
FINANCING  scenario.Price Support at Any Price?  35
6. Main conclusions from the simulation analysis
The main conclusion  we draw from the simulation  analysis is that price support is not the
only, and moreover  not the most efficient way in which Poland can support its agricultural  sector.
This conclusion  does not mean that food prices should not be stabilized. However, the stabilized
domestic price level should not exceed  the world price level.
The main challenges  the sector has to face, namely finding  a new equilibrium  position in the
market economy  and integrating  with the EU require a deep restructuring of the sector  to close (or
reduce)  productivity  gaps vis-a-vis the EU agriculture  and the other sectors of the Polish economy.
Reduction of productivity  gaps is a precondition  for an appropriate  income and living standard  for
farmers, as well as  for  a successful competition  on the single market without borders with Western
European  farmers.
The most efficient way to solve  the structural  problems of the Polish agriculture is
acceleration  of reduction of the agricultural employment. Such a policy may require significant
investment  in promotion  of the new  jobs for farmers, and for training. As a result, not only the low
labor productivity  problem may be solved, but also a substantial  improvement  may be obtained in a
level of the rural areas development  and living standards. Best support for the Polish agriculture is to
increase  its productivity. The market-led  process of reducing the agnicultural  employment must not
be slowed down.  Instead, supporting  policies may be introduced  if there are possibilities of
accelerating  and easing the process.
Can Poland afford transfers to the agricultural sector that allow for an accelerated
restructuring?
First, one may ask the opposite  question: can Poland afford a slow path of restructuring  of the
agricultural  sector? The sector would become  a growing burden for the economic  growth. Earlier or
later a kind of an income support may appear unavoidable  from the social point of view.
Second, Poland has already reached a level of transfers to the sector over $ 2bn yearly
(OECD, 1995). The problem is therefore  not if the resources  are to be transferred, but rather how
they should be transferred  to obtain the highest efficiency.
Third, the restructuring  process does not necessarily  have to be so costly for the other
economic  agents. Figure 15 shows the net burden for the rest of the economy  (taxpayers,  other
sectors, consumers)  obtained in the simulation  experirnents".  Let us notice, that only price support
systems  create a heavy burden. In the case of policies of reduction  of the number of farmers,
17 'Price  support"  experiments  show  effects  of various  paths  of reaching  CAP  price  levels.  "Alternatives"
experiments  show  effects  of policies  reducing  agricultural  employment  (without  price supporting).  'Gradual
integration"  experiments  represent  a mix of the slowest  path of reaching  CAP prices and policies  aimed  at
employment  reduction,Price Support at Any Price?  36
macroeconomic  gains appear bigger than policy costs.  It means  that (except for the first years of
applying  the policies) the policies may be financed  from additional  economic  growth.
Agricultural  Policy  Effects  for the Rest  of Economy
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Figure  15
Successful integration of the Polish agriculture  with the EU require a fast restructuring  of
the sector.  The resources  for restructuring  that the Polish economy  may find are scarce; therefore,
it is even more important that they are used in an effective way.
Efficiency  of the restructuring  efforts will be to a big degree reduced, if the accompanying
policies have contradictory  effects (slowing  down restructuring  and economic  growth). Therefore, a
preferable  way of supporting  the income  relation in the period prior to Poland's full participation  in
the CAP is accelerating  agricultural  employment  reduction  rather than supporting  prices.Price Support  at Any Price?  37
Appendix
The POLAGR model: main features
POLAGR  is a Computable  General Equilibrium  model  of the Polish economy, developed  for
agricultural policy analysis'8. The main characteristics  of the model are following:
(a)  Disaggregation  level: 26 sectors (12 agricultural  products, 12 food processing  industries,  other
industries, services).
(b)  Social  Accounting  Matrix: the SAM matrix for 1991, developed  on a basis on the 1990 SAM, 1990
input-output  table, National  Accounts  by institutional  sectors for 1991, 1991 surveys  of farms
(production  technologies  applied), 1991  households  surveys' 9.
(c)  Market clearinn variables:  market prices for non agricultural  branches (14 branches); surplus  production
for 12 food products;  wage for the labor market; deficit for the budget; trade balance for foreign trade.
(d)  Macro closure: savings  (investment).
(e)  Production  factor mobility: mobile in a short run (1 year): labor (except farmers' labor);
mobile in a medium run (over 1 year): capital, farmers' labor'O
(Q)  Labor suvvlv proiections:  projection  based on the age structure  of farmers  and non-farmer  population  in
1991,  demographic  projections  until 2020 (source: GUS and Polish Academy  of Sciences),model  of
labor distribution  by farmers and labor reduction in agriculture  (see (i)).
(g)  Sources  of parameters:
Production  functions:  Cobb Douglas, estimated  on 1992-93  cross section sample (regions of Poland).
Consumer  demandfunctions:  indirect addilog system, estimated on 1970-92  time series.
Armingtonfunctions:  estimated on 1990-94  quarterly time series.
Land distributionfunctions  in agriculture,  functions of labor distribution  by farmers and labor reduction
in agriculture:  estimated on 1982-94  time series.
Export  demandfunctions:  literature search.
Otherparameters:  calibrated  on a basis of the 1991 SAM.
(h)  The structure  of the model:  presented in the graph (next page).
18  A preliminary version of the model may be found in Czyzewski,  Orlowski, 1993a.
19  Sources  of data: Central Statistical Office (GUS), Research Center for Economic  and Statistical Studies,
Warsaw, Institute of Economics  of Agriculture  and Food Economy,  Warsaw
20  Please note, that as a result of short-time  farmers' labor  and capital rigidity, the agricultural  output is fixed
in short term (1 year) and inelastic  with  respect to prices.  However,  the output reacts  to changes  in relative  prices
in medium period (lagged relative prices and income relations influence both supply of production factors and
agricultural  production  structure.'  t '  1  OOD  AFi  g  ,  j  labor
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(i)  Model  of labor distribution  by farmers  and emplovment  reduction  in agriculture:
The model is composed  of 2 parts.  The first part describes  a process  of reduction  of employment  in agriculture:
number of farmers  below 35 years old 2'  as a function  of the observed  trend of decline  (represented  by a lower
than one elasticity  with respect to the lagged employment),  job offers generated  by the economy (outside
agriculture, expected  elasticity  < 0, as more offers makes it easier for young farmers to find a job outside
agriculture) and the income relation (expected  elasticity  > 0,as high income relation  encourages  farmers  to stay in
agriculture). The second  part describes decisions  of all the farmers (who did not move out of agriculture)  about
splitting  their endowment  of labor into 2 parts: labor supplied to agriculture, and labor supplied outside
agriculture (to the non-agricultural  labor market, i.e. to non farming activities). The decision is crucial, as it
determinates  to what extent farmers' income depends  on the income from fanning activities. The distribution  of
labor depends  on the existing trend (falling share of income from farming)  and the income relation (expected
elasticity  > 1, as high income relation  discourages  farmers from searching  for additional  sources of income).
a. Model  of enployment  reduction  (farmers  below 35 years old)
Employment=a*Employment  ,_b*Job  offers  ,9*Income  relation(,,t-2,t  3)5*eU
9 Ix
where:  Employment  - number  of farmers below 35 years old, Job offers - number of new jobs offers in non-
agricultural  sectors, Income relation - ratio of the average income of a farmer to the average wage,
U91 - dummy, 1991  =1 (rapid increase in urban unemployment).  Subscript  t-  1 means I period lag.
Subscript  (t-l,t-2,t-3) means an average from 3 last periods.
Sample: 198C-1993
Estimated  ela.ticities (t-statistics  in parentheses):
b=0.747 (4.54), g=-0.873 (2.40), s=0.234 (3.44), x=0.095 (2.65)  R2=0.955
b. Model of  labor distribution  (all  farmers)
Labor distribution  = a*lncome  relation%,,l1 2 t 3)b*Trendg
where:  Labor distribution  - ratio of labor supplied  by farmers  to agriculture  to labor supplied outside
agriculture  (to the non-agricultural  labor market, i.e. to non farming activities), Trend - trend variable,
1980  value=1,  1993 value= 14.  Subscript  (t-l,t-2,t-3) means an average from 3 last periods.
Sample: 1980-1993
Estimated  elasticities (t-statistics  in parentheses):
b=0.983 (4.84), g=-0.027 (1.61)  R2=0.923
21  A group of farmers likely to make a decision  of moving  out of agriculture  (OECD, 1994a).Pice  Support  at Any Price?  40
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